Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts by Hoffman, Adam
HOFFMAN 04/30/01 4:05 PM
1427
Notes
CORRALLING CONSTITUTIONAL FACT:
DE NOVO FACT REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE COURTS
ADAM HOFFMAN
No two terms of legal science have rendered better service than
“law” and “fact.” They are basic assumptions; irreducible minimums
and the most comprehensive maximums at the same instant. They
readily accommodate themselves to any meaning we desire to give
them. . . . What judge has not found refuge in them? The man who
could succeed in defining them would be a public enemy. They may
torture the souls of language mechanicians who insist that all words
and phrases must have a fixed content, but they and their flexibility
are essential to the science which has to do with the control of men
through the power to pass judgment on their conduct.
Leon Green1
We acknowledge that there are more verbal formulas for the scope
of appellate review . . . than there are distinctions actually capable of
being drawn in the practice of appellate review. But even if, as we
have sometimes heretically suggested, there are operationally only
two degrees of review, plenary (that is, no deference given to the
tribunal being reviewed) and deferential, that distinction at least is a
feasible, intelligible, and important one.
Richard Posner2
Copyright © 2001 by Adam Hoffman.
1. JUDGE AND JURY 270-71 (1930).
2. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
HOFFMAN 04/30/01  4:05 PM
1428 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1427
INTRODUCTION
As a recent circuit split indicates, the scope of application of the
federal doctrine of constitutional fact, under which fact determina-
tions are subjected to plenary review, remains a contested if some-
what esoteric corner of the law. In Mahaffey v. Page,3 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a de novo standard of review for a
trial court’s determination of a prima facie showing of racial discrimi-
nation in the use of a peremptory strike.4 The Mahaffey court noted
that although the ultimate determination of whether the striking
counsel’s intent was discrimination is an issue of fact to be reviewed
deferentially, whether the facts alleged by the defendant make a
prima facie case of discrimination is a mixed question of fact and law.5
Because the question was mixed, the allocation between the finder of
fact and the reviewing court of the primary burden of answering it
was not easily settled. The court decided on a de novo standard,
thereby allocating that burden to itself, for two reasons. Most deci-
sive, according to the decision, was the importance of the constitu-
tional right at issue and the gravity of the threat to that right in the
3. 162 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1998).
4. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986), the burden is on the defendant to
make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor, who must provide a race-neutral justification for the strike or strikes in ques-
tion. The court then determines whether this justification is pretextual. Mahaffey, 162 F.3d at
482-83. Mahaffey was limited in United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2000), which,
while confirming that the prima facie determination is to be reviewed de novo, held that where
the defendant’s prima facie showing of discrimination and the prosecution’s response are made
simultaneously, the trial judge’s determination is to be reviewed for clear error. Id. at 686.
5. Mahaffey, 162 F.3d at 484. The term “mixed question of fact and law” is often applied
when a legal standard must be applied to a set of facts. At times, elements of fact and law are so
entangled that the legal rule cannot easily be defined except in relation to the factual element.
There are several reasons why this might be so. The rule might be new and still in the process of
being worked out through application. There may be a failure to agree on a clear rule of law.
See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text. Or there may be resistance to abstracting the rule
much beyond facts of cases for reasons of public policy. For example, Oliver Wendell Holmes
argued that negligence was largely left to be redefined by the jury in each case, because the ju-
rors bring to negligence actions the promise that “they will introduce into their verdict a certain
amount . . . of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with the
wishes and feelings of the community.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in
Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 459-60 (1899). On the nature of mixed questions in general, see,
for example, FRANCIS BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 602-06 (1926) (explaining why
the jury system causes questions of law and fact to be “mixed”), and Clarence Morris, Law and
Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942) (developing the essential differences between law and fact).
Primarily for reasons of judicial economy, the legal consequence of the application of a
legal standard to facts, as opposed to the prior question of what standard to apply to those facts,
is generally held to be a question of fact. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286 n.16
(1982) (holding that “ultimate fact,” which is to say the legal significance drawn from the facts
of the case, is not to be treated separately from the general facts of the case).
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trial proceedings, as “all seven African-American members of the
jury venire were excused by the State” in a racially sensitive case of
an African-American man charged with murdering a white couple.6
The second justification for the standard applied was the need
for the appellate courts to maintain control over law declaration7 in
this area of the law, as “factual scenarios will recur in this context,
and de novo review would allow for a measure of consistency in the
treatment of similar factual settings.”8
In Tolbert v. Page,9 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, took up the same question. The Tolbert court agreed that the
question was a mixed question of law and fact, but came to the con-
clusion that the determination of the trial court was to be reviewed
for clear error.10 The court based its decision on two grounds. First, it
held that the allocation of responsibility between the trier of fact and
the court of review for deciding a mixed question, which the court
called the “law-fact distinction,”11 should be based on which party is
6. Mahaffey, 162 F.3d at 484-85.
7. Henry Hart and Albert Sacks first divided the judicial decision into “law declaration”
(the articulation of the rules of law), “fact identification” (the determination of the facts specific
to the case at hand), and “law application” (the application of the rules of law to the facts of the
case). HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 374-75 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Foundation Press 1994) (1958). In a mixed question of fact and law, the trier of fact “instead of
being asked to apply a statement of law declaration, is requested to formulate an ad hoc legal
rule in conformity with a generalized standard.” Note, Supreme Court Review of State Findings
of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN. L. REV. 328, 336 (1962).
8. Mahaffey, 162 F.3d at 484.
9. 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
10. Id. at 681-82.
11. Almost every procedural issue in a lawsuit depends on whether a matter is categorized
as a question of fact or a question of law—from who the decisionmaker in the matter will be, to
what evidence it will consider, to what standard a reviewing court will apply to its decision.
Some would argue that the distinctions are simply a matter of allocation; questions of fact are
for the jury or the judge acting as factfinder and questions of law are for the judge, with all the
procedures that their respective roles entail. In this view, “fact” and “law” are merely
placeholders for allocative decisions made on the basis of factors external to the nature of the
questions themselves. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (“[T]he fact/law dis-
tinction at times has turned on a determination that . . . one judicial actor is better positioned
than another to decide the issue in question.”); Kenneth Vinson, Disentangling Law and Fact:
Echoes of Proximate Cause in the Workers’ Compensation Coverage Formula, 47 ALA. L. REV.
723, 743 (1996) (“[I]n cases where a jury is asked to apply the reasonable care standard to un-
disputed history, the truth is that issue is called a question of fact only because we chose to pass
it to the jury.”). More commonly, it is argued that there are inherent differences between fact
and law that are related to, but not identical to, allocation. What these differences are, however,
has been a source of intense debate at least since the arguments in the late nineteenth century
over the nature of the jury’s role in findings of negligence. See infra note 130 and accompanying
text. Moreover, such arguments are complicated by, and often centered on, the vexing problem
of “mixed” questions of law and fact.
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“better positioned” to make the call.12 In the matter of a Batson de-
termination, the court held, the trial judge was in a better position be-
cause he could observe first-hand the prosecutor’s and the stricken ju-
rors’ demeanor and attitude during voir dire.13
The Tolbert court was not terribly worried about the nature of
the threat to the constitutional right at issue,14 but like the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals it also justified its decision on whether
“probing appellate scrutiny will . . . contribute to the clarity of legal
doctrine.”15 The court held that because Batson analysis is “a ‘factual
inquiry’ that ‘takes into account all the possible explanatory factors’
in the particular case,” it is reliant on “multifarious, fleeting, special,
narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.”16 In other words, there
is little chance for law declaration in the review of Batson determina-
tions.
De novo review of the facts underlying the application of a con-
stitutional standard is often characterized as the review of “constitu-
tional fact.” In describing the standard at work in constitutional fact
review, courts use several interchangeable terms, including “de
novo,” “free,” “independent,” and “plenary” review. As they are
used in these cases, they are all synonymous.17 Under constitutional
fact doctrine, “[i]n determining whether [a] constitutional standard
has been satisfied, the reviewing court must consider the factual rec-
ord in full.”18 This “independent review”19 of the record is a strong ex-
ception to the default approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, under which the alignment between categories of fact and law
and the standard of appellate review is very close; court findings of
fact are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard20 and findings
of law are reviewed de novo.21 Under this scheme, “[i]deally, the ques-
12. Tolbert, 182 F.3d at 681.
13. Id. at 683.
14. The dissenting judge worried, however. The dissent argued that when a mixed question
“implicates constitutional rights,” a less deferential standard of review is “favored.” Id. at 689-90
(McKeown, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 682 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 684 (citations omitted).
17. STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
§ 2.14, at 2-79 (3d ed. 1999).
18. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (“We must ‘make an inde-
pendent examination of the whole record,’ so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”) (citations omitted).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
21. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).
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tion of the appropriate standard of review of any issue may be re-
solved by reference to this law/fact distinction.”22 In recent years, the
Supreme Court has “moved decisively” to ensure that this distinction
is applied as consistently as possible, primarily in the name of lessen-
ing the burden on the docket of the federal appellate courts.23 Consti-
tutional fact doctrine represents one of the few points of resistance to
this trend of ever-greater deference to the findings of the trial court.24
This Note will seek to address two questions. The first concerns
the actual scope of the application of constitutional fact. Some com-
mentators have included several lines of constitutional cases under
the rubric and analytical framework of constitutional fact,25 while oth-
ers have contended that this framework is properly applied only to
fact review in First Amendment cases,26 and even then find little to
distinguish between constitutional fact review and other exceptions to
the clear-error standard.27 This Note will demonstrate that a family of
case lines can be clearly delineated as forming the basis of the doc-
trine but that the Supreme Court has grounded these lines in some-
what different rationales. In the last fifteen years, these lines have
converged into a more coherent doctrine as the Court has sought to
limit the expansion of constitutional fact to new areas of review.
The second question addressed in this Note is whether this now
more coherent doctrine creates a constitutional fact standard that can
both be successfully applied by lower appellate courts to questions of
22. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the
Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 157, 171 (1985).
23. Martin B. Louis, Discretion or Law: Appellate Review of Determinations That Rule 11
Has Been Violated or That Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Will Be Imposed Offensively, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 733, 738 (1990).
24. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Pro-
cedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1005 (1986).
25. E.g., Frank R. Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 46 N.C. L. REV.
223 (1968). Strong includes in his analysis lines of cases concerning both “procedural” liberties
such as Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights reviewed on habeas grounds and the “substantive”
civil liberties addressed in First Amendment cases. I have adopted the terms “procedural” and
“substantive” to structure my own analysis in this Note.
26. E.g., Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First Amendment Model
of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1241 (1996) (arguing that free speech interests
justify applying a constitutional fact, as opposed to a clear-error, standard of review to First
Amendment cases).
27. Id. at 1240 (noting that the abundance of cases that “merely restate legal conclusions or
mixed law-fact questions fall outside complete fact-finding protections, such as the clearly erro-
neous standard of Federal Rule 52(a) . . . are not revolutionary or particularly necessary as a
separate exception”).
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first impression and act to limit the instances in which these courts
will expand plenary review to new areas of the law.
The first part of this Note will seek to define the scope of consti-
tutional fact review. Section A of this part will review the basic fea-
tures of the doctrine and its relationship to the federal rules. Section
B will examine the three lines of cases—administrative, procedural,
and substantive—from which the modern doctrine of constitutional
fact has emerged. It is within this historical discourse that the justifi-
cation for independent review of facts has been articulated.
The Supreme Court has utilized three primary rationales for ap-
plying plenary review to what would otherwise be regarded as issues
of fact requiring only “clear error” review. These rationales can be
seen at work in Mahaffey, with its focus on the constitutional right
endangered by discrimination in jury selection and the opportunity
for law declaration in de novo appellate review; in Tolbert, with its at-
tention to the greater trustworthiness of the trial court’s vantage
point; and again in the law-declarative opportunity, or lack thereof,
that appellate review presents.
These reasons can be recast as arguments that independent re-
view is or is not necessary (1) because the nature of the question itself
is that of a mixed question of fact and law, the law aspect of which is
given content only through application; (2) because the constitutional
value at stake is so great and so vulnerable; and (3) because the trier
of fact, because of issues of either competence or bias, cannot be
trusted to make the decision.
These rationales exist to some degree in all findings of constitu-
tional fact. For example, the argument that review is necessary to pro-
tect a constitutional right includes an implicit argument that the trier
of fact cannot be trusted to protect that right on its own.28 However,
the relationship between the three rationales varies in particular judi-
cial decisions. In Section C of Part I, I will describe the development
of constitutional fact doctrine and how the competing rationales for
the doctrine have come to be prioritized in the recent era. In the
modern era, decisions concerning “procedural” rights have focused
primarily on the nature of the question,29 while both the remnants of
28. See infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
29. E.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (“[T]he legal rules for probable
cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application. Independent review is
therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal princi-
ples.”); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995) (holding that determination of whether a
suspect is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of fact and law subject to “in-
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the now mostly dormant administrative line and the still-vital “sub-
stantive” First Amendment line have looked first to the nature of the
threatened right.30 This focus on constitutional right has been the
subject of sustained and influential academic criticism.31 These critics
have worried that establishing a duty to review all cases in which con-
stitutionally based standards of law were applied to specific facts
would either drown the courts or eviscerate review.32 Henry Mona-
ghan, for example, argued that the court could never successfully ar-
ticulate why some constitutional rights were deserving of the protec-
tion provided by independent review while others were not, and
therefore could never limit the application of the doctrine on the ba-
sis of the nature of the right.33
These critics have suggested various limiting principles to the
constitutional fact doctrine. Monaghan proposes that the primary test
in the application of plenary review should be whether the issue at
hand concerns the sort of mixed question of fact and law where the
appellate court is just as competent as the trial court to define and
apply the law and where appellate control of this process of definition
is necessary.34 Under the influence of this approach, the “procedural”
and “substantive” lines of constitutional fact doctrine have been
largely reconciled into a single standard, in which the nature of the
question rather than the nature of the right is the primary focus. For
dependent review”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (arguing, in regard to the review
of determinations of the voluntariness of confessions, that where the “legal principle can be
given meaning only through its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court
has been reluctant to give the trier of fact’s conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip
a federal appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of law”); Container Corp. of
Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983) (declaring that not “every colorable claim”
can be reviewed de novo).
30. E.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984)
(arguing, in holding that determinations of actual malice in defamation cases must be reviewed
de novo, that “the constitutional values protected by the rule make it imperative that judges—
and in some cases judges of this Court—make sure that it is correctly applied”); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-49 (1983) (weighing the public employee’s right to comment on office
policy against the state’s interest in effective employment); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (“We must ‘make an independent examination of the whole record,’ so as
to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of
free expression.” (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963))).
31. These critics are best represented in the administrative law context by John Dickenson.
E.g., John Dickenson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of
Questions of “Constitutional Fact,” 80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055, 1072-82 (1932). In the First
Amendment context they are legion, but the most influential analysis and critique is Henry P.
Monaghan’s Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985).
32. Dickenson, supra note 31, at 1077; Monaghan, supra note 31, at 264.
33. Monaghan, supra note 31, at 264.
34. Id. at 271.
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example, in Miller v. Fenton,35 Justice O’Connor announced a new
three-factor test for when to apply plenary review to fact determina-
tions: stare decisis; “the nature of the inquiry itself”; and the likeli-
hood of bias on the part of the factfinder.36
Having defined the scope of constitutional fact doctrine, this
Note will critique in Part II the current manifestation of the doctrine.
Constitutional standards are often defined through their application
(one might say that this is a universal feature of law) and an effective
limiting principle for when constitutional fact review should be ap-
plied must be established if the doctrine is to remain an effective tool
by which appellate courts can fully protect constitutional rights. The
doctrine adopted by the current Court seems to work well for the Su-
preme Court itself, if the Court’s own comfort in expanding the range
of questions to which it has applied constitutional fact review is any
indication. But it is not yet clear if this willingness to expand the
scope of application of constitutional fact reflects the Court’s confi-
dence that it has created an effectively self-limiting doctrine, or only
the Court’s confidence in its own self-discipline in monitoring and
regulating any further expansion.
I.  DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACT DOCTRINE
This Note primarily addresses the scope of the constitutional fact
doctrine’s application. This question is best initially explored by de-
scribing the three lines of cases in which the doctrine of constitutional
fact has been developed. The meaning of the term “constitutional
fact” as it is used in this Note must first be defined, however.
A. What is Constitutional Fact?
1. Distinguished from Legislative Fact. One must distinguish
constitutional fact doctrine in the sense of a standard of review from
another common use of the term “constitutional fact” or
“constitutional factfinding” as referring to the legislative facts that
35. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
36. Id. at 115-17.
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form the premises for constitutional rulings.37 An example of the
latter can be seen in Lochner v. New York,38 where the Court based
its finding of a right to contract in part on its view of the real world
respective bargaining positions of management and labor.39
The terms “adjudicative fact” and “legislative fact” were intro-
duced by Kenneth Culp Davis in his 1942 article, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process.40 Professor Davis
distinguished between “facts concerning immediate parties—what the
parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background condi-
tions were,” which he called adjudicative, and questions of policy,
which he called legislative.41 He later refined this distinction:
Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what,
where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative
facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case.
Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but
are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and
policy and discretion.42
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v.
Gould,43 “Legislative facts are established truths, facts or pronounce-
ments that do not change from case to case but apply universally,
while adjudicative facts are those developed in a particular case.”44
The facts reviewed under constitutional fact doctrine are adjudicative
facts, specific to the case at hand.45
37. One of the most well-known accounts of the latter usage is that of David L. Faigman,
“Normative Constitutional Fact-finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional
Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991) (arguing that empirical research forces courts to
attend to, and to be accountable for, value judgments underlying their factual jurisprudence).
Such premises are to be distinguished from legislative facts, which serve as the basis of law-
making by Congress and must be reviewed more deferentially.
38. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39. Id. at 56.
40. 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
41. Id. at 402.
42. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
43. 536 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 220; see also Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding
Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1988) (suggesting the term “premise facts” as
an alternative to refer to any fact that serves as the premise for a reasoned decision of law).
Judge Keeton’s term has the virtue of emphasizing that the procedural treatment of a fact as an
adjudicative or legislative fact does not depend on the nature of the fact in dispute, but rather
on its function in the court’s process (both mental and judicial).
45. Monaghan, supra note 31, at 230-31 n.16 (“The adjudicative facts decisive of constitu-
tional claims usually pertain to the concrete application of a statute or regulation being chal-
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2. Constitutional Fact Review and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), “[f]indings
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses.”46 In the context of direct appeals in civil cases,
constitutional fact seems to contradict this rule. For example, the
question in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,47 as
posed by the Supreme Court, was whether Rule 52(a) prohibits the
independent review prescribed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan48 in
a defamation case concerning whether a false statement was made
with actual malice.49 Although such a determination might seem to be
the sort of credibility finding explicitly mentioned as deserving
deference in Rule 52(a),50 the Court found that independent review
was not precluded.51 As I will discuss in greater detail,52 the Court
would later strive to characterize the outcome in Bose as consistent
with the trial court’s findings on credibility, and so consistent with
Rule 52(a).53
Independent review does not mean that the reviewing court can
review the factual record as a whole, but it must review any part of
the record relating to the legal question at issue.54 As the Court held
in Bose, “The independent review function is not equivalent to a ‘de
novo’ review of the ultimate judgment itself, in which a reviewing
court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to decide
lenged on constitutional grounds. Constitutional fact review thus does not implicate the legisla-
tive facts that underlie the statute or regulation in its general application.” (citations omitted)).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). The “clearly erroneous” standard is itself somewhat vaguely de-
fined. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (“If the district
court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court
of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence differently.”); United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when despite evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.”). As can be seen from both of these definitions, the major feature
of the standard is deference to the trial court.
47. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
48. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964).
49. Bose, 466 U.S. at 487.
50. Bose, 466 U.S. at 515 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
51. Id. at 510-11.
52. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
53. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995)
(explaining that independent review “does not limit our deference to a trial court on matters of
witness credibility”).
54. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 17, § 2.14.
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whether or not it believes that judgment should be entered for plain-
tiff.”55
The equivalent of Rule 52(a) in habeas corpus cases is 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the clear rule was that an in-
dependent federal inquiry into the state record was required where
the inquiry was a mixed question subject to plenary review.56 As will
be discussed in the next section, the passage of AEDPA has left the
nature of the application of constitutional fact doctrine in habeas cor-
pus cases in doubt.
3. Standard of Review and the Nature of the Factfinder. In cases
on direct appeal from federal courts, while the specific nature of the
right at issue will have some effect on how constitutional fact review
is applied, the standard of review is the same regardless of the nature
of the finder of fact being reviewed.57
The standard of review in habeas petitions is governed by the
AEDPA, under which Title 28 § 2254(d) now reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
55. Bose, 466 U.S. at 514 n.31.
56. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985).
57. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501 (“[T]he rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitu-
tional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether the factfinding func-
tion be performed in the particular case by a jury or by a trial judge.”). Where the constitutional
fact doctrine does not apply, the deferential standard to be applied to the findings of the trier of
fact is in theory different for findings by a trial judge and by a jury. The judge is reviewed under
a clearly erroneous standard, while the jury is reviewed under a clear weight of the evidence
standard. The difference between these standards is slight, however, and hard to articulate. As a
result, courts will often analyze jury findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Note, Ampli-
fying Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union: The Proper Scope of De Novo Appellate Review in Pub-
lic Person Defamation Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 582 n.30 (1989); see also Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-97 (1996) (holding that plenary review applies in the same way
to procedural-rights cases being heard on habeas and on direct appeal, and holding that “rea-
sonable suspicion” and “probable cause” determinations are subject to plenary review). Ornelas
was responding to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ position that the Supreme Court’s rule
in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985), applying plenary review to voluntariness of confes-
sion determinations in habeas corpus appeals, did not necessarily apply to cases on direct ap-
peal. United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1995). Depending on what effect
AEDPA is found to have on the application of constitutional fact doctrine to habeas corpus
cases, Ornelas may now simply stand for the rule that plenary review is to be applied to those
procedural rights cases on direct appeal to which it has been held to apply in the past in either
habeas or direct appeals.
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.58
Section 2254(d)(1) was interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Taylor.59 The majority’s view on the meaning of the
AEDPA was given in a concurrence by Justice O’Connor, while Jus-
tice Stevens wrote the decision on the narrower question of whether
the state court’s decision was contrary to the federal test for ineffec-
tive counsel as established by the Supreme Court.60 Justice O’Connor
held that the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of
the section are to be read independently.61 Thus, the Court distin-
guished the effect of the AEDPA on questions of law from its effect
on questions of the application of the law to the facts.62
Under Williams, a state court’s decision is contrary to Supreme
Court precedent if it “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by this Court on a question of law,” or if it arrives at an opposite re-
sult to a Supreme Court precedent that is “materially indistinguish-
able” on the facts.63 An application of Supreme Court precedent is
unreasonable if the state court identifies the correct rule of law but
“unreasonably applies it to the facts,” or where the state court ex-
tends the rule of the precedent “to a new context where it should not
apply” or fails to extend it where it should apply.64 The court gives lit-
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
59. 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
60. Id. at 1512.
61. Id. at 1519 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued that the clauses ought to
be read together as expressing merely a “mood” of respect for state court decisions, rather than
a more deferential standard of review. Id. at 1509.
62. The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 319, 322 (2000)
[hereinafter Supreme Court].
63. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1519 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1520 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Rejecting the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’
view that under § 2254(d)(1) an application is unreasonable only where all reasonable jurists
would agree that it is unreasonable, Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998), the
Court held that the standard of reasonableness is an objective one. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1521
(O’Connor, J., concurring). In so doing, the Court probably made the standard of review less
deferential than Congress intended. There is evidence in the legislative record that Congress
intended the AEDPA to enact the rule, suggested by Justice Thomas in Wright v. West, 505 U.S.
277, 291 (1992), that federal courts may not apply new rules that are “susceptible to debate
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tle help in defining the term “unreasonable,” beyond noting that a
writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued where the reviewing court
“concludes in its independent judgment that the . . . decision applied
clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that
application must also be unreasonable.”65
As the Court has not ruled directly on the question, it is not
possible to say definitively whether a constitutional fact
determination, as a mixed question of fact and law, would be subject
to the “contrary to” or the “unreasonable” analysis. However, it is
likely that the “unreasonable” standard would be applied. Justice
O’Connor indicates that she would define at least one such
determination, that of the voluntariness of a confession, as an
“application of constitutional law to fact,”66 indicating that the
unreasonable application clause would apply.67 However, as I will
among reasonable minds” retroactively to habeas petitions. Supreme Court, supra note 62, at
325.
65. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1521-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently solved the problem by ruling that the “unreasonable application” standard
is equivalent to the “clearly erroneous” standard applied to factual determinations by district
courts. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000). This ruling seems to be a
bow to the notion that there are really only two standards of review possible, deferential and
nondeferential. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
66. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1521-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
67. It might be argued that at least some constitutional fact questions are actually determi-
nations of fact governed by § 2254(d)(2). Under the “two-tiered” approach currently favored by
the Court, see infra notes 132-35, 195 and accompanying text, some constitutional fact questions
can be both questions of fact and of application of law to fact at the same time. In one of the few
cases interpreting the application of § 2254(d)(2) to a constitutional fact determination, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court holding that the review of the deter-
mination of whether a suspect was “in custody” for Miranda purposes was governed by §
2254(d)(2), holding that (d)(1) applied instead. Evans v. Rogerson, 223 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir.
2000). In an example of the two-tiered approach, the Supreme Court has broken the “in cus-
tody” determination into “[t]wo discrete inquiries.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112
(1995). The first is the purely factual determination of the circumstances surrounding the inter-
rogation of the defendant. The second is the determination of whether a reasonable person
would have felt himself to be “in custody” in those circumstances. Id. The Evans court found
that the underlying facts were not in dispute, and so only the latter question, a question of appli-
cation, was at issue. Evans, 223 F.3d at 872.
If § 2254(d)(2) were to be found to apply, it is unclear whether the analysis would differ
from that under § 2254(d)(1) in any case. At least one circuit has found that whether § (d)(1) or
§ (d)(2) is applied “makes no difference for purposes of the standard of review,” as the “unrea-
sonable” standard of (d)(1) is the same as that of (d)(2). Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107-
08 (9th Cir. 2000) (following Van Tran in applying a clear error standard). On the other hand,
§ 2254(e)(1) requires a habeas court to presume that factual determinations made by the state
court are correct and places the burden on the petitioner to rebut that presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). Together, §§ 2254(e)(1) and (d)(2)
make it extremely difficult for a federal court to overturn a state court’s finding of fact. See, e.g.,
Givens v. Yukins, No. 98-2429, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31952, at *27-30 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 5,
HOFFMAN 04/30/01  4:05 PM
1440 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1427
discuss in greater detail,68 it is often difficult to draw a clear line
between rules and the application of rules. Justice Stevens makes this
point in Williams, noting:
[A]n erroneous conclusion that particular circumstances established
the voluntariness of a confession . . . may well be described either as
“contrary to” or as an “unreasonable application of” the governing
rule of law. In constitutional adjudication, as in the common law,
rules of law often develop incrementally as earlier decisions are ap-
plied to new factual situations. But rules that depend on such elabo-
ration are hardly less lawlike than those that establish a bright-line
test.69
In any case, it is not clear how much it matters whether questions of
constitutional fact are treated as questions of law or of application, as
under either approach the review of state court decisions must be
deferential. It is therefore likely that federal courts will no longer ap-
ply plenary review to questions of constitutional fact in habeas cases.
At the same time, it is also likely that state appellate courts must ap-
ply plenary review themselves to constitutional fact determinations
where the Supreme Court has determined that such review is consti-
tutionally required, as a failure to do so would be to act contrary to
Court precedent. In Williams itself, in the analogous matter of the
application of the Strickland test for ineffective counsel claims, the
Court found that the state court had failed both in its understanding
of the rule and in its application of the rule, in part because the court
“failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence.”70
Failure to evaluate evidence as thoroughly as a constitutional rule re-
quires would therefore appear to qualify as unreasonable application
of a rule.71
However, under AEDPA, state courts are bound only by federal
law “as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”72
This means that lower federal courts cannot review state courts’ fail-
ure to apply constitutional fact review where such review has not
been established by the Supreme Court, even where federal courts of
2000) (applying §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) in finding reasonable a state court’s crediting of police
witnesses over a defendant’s testimony that a waiver of Miranda rights was not voluntary).
68. See infra Part IIB.
69. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1508 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 1515.
71. Supreme Court, supra note 62, at 328-29.
72. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523.
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appeals have prescribed constitutional fact review.73 The potential for
the expansion of the scope of application of constitutional fact review
is therefore severely limited in habeas cases.
4. Scope of Review of Factual Record. The depth to which the
appellate court should delve into the factual record has been a matter
of continuing dispute, particularly in the First Amendment line of
cases. The source of this dispute was the Bose decision’s lack of
clarity about how to define “review of the whole record,” particularly
in regard to the trier’s of facts credibility findings. The Bose Court
said that independent review of actual malice was compatible with
Rule 52(a)’s mandate that findings of fact should be reviewed for
clear error, because actual malice is a mixed question in which “the
reasoning by which a fact is ‘found’ crosses the line between
application of those ordinary principles of logic and common
experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact into the
realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court must exercise its
own independent judgment.”74 The Court did not, however, explain
how its decision to reverse the jury’s determination that the writer of
the article at issue acted with actual malice was consistent with Rule
52(a)’s further mandate that due regard be given to the trial court’s
“opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.”75
Over time, the Supreme Court “clarified” Bose, holding that the
reviewing court was to give deference to the credibility determina-
tions of the trier of fact when reviewing the factual record.76 However,
73. Id.
74. Bose, 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1985).
75. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact
of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 274-75 (1987) (“The Court in Bose . . . ducked the
hard question of how an appellate court is supposed to conduct a meaningful independent re-
view of the evidence when actual malice hinges on the publisher’s subjective state of mind.”).
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, seized upon the issue of credibility in his dissent
in Bose. He pointed out that the constitutional fact doctrine had never before been applied to
actual state-of-mind determinations by the finder of fact. Bose, 466 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In other applications of the doctrine in First Amendment cases, courts have consid-
ered what the reaction of a “reasonable person” to speech would be, a determination that ap-
pellate courts were as competent as or more competent than trial courts to make. Id. at 515-17.
76. E.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 689 n.35 (1989)
(citations omitted):
[Petitioner] contends, however, that this Court did reject the trial court’s credibility
determination in Bose. We disagree with this reading of Bose. In Bose we accepted
the trial court’s determination that the author of the report at issue did not provide
credible testimony concerning the reason for his choice of words and his understand-
ing of the meaning of the word “about.” Unlike the District Court, however, we were
unwilling to infer actual malice from the finding that the witness “refused to admit
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in trying to reconcile Bose and Rule 52(a), the courts of appeals faced
the dilemma that when, as in most cases, the jury’s decision was a
general verdict, there was no way for the appellate court to know ex-
actly what the jury’s credibility determinations were.77 Some courts
solved the problem by “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of
the verdict of the jury, and then determin[ing] whether that evidence
demonstrates clearly and convincingly that the defendant acted with
actual malice.”78 Such an approach would have made constitutional
fact review little different from a sufficiency of evidence determina-
tion, which was probably the result the courts applying this approach
hoped to achieve.79 Courts that were uncomfortable with de novo re-
view of fact used the dilemma created by applying both Bose and
Rule 52(a) as an opportunity largely to vitiate plenary review.
This avenue for limiting Bose was blocked by the Supreme Court
in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton.80 The Court
made it clear that, while credibility determinations were to be re-
viewed for clear error, constitutional fact review must be review “of
the entire factual basis for a jury’s finding . . . a review that examines
both the subsidiary facts underlying the jury’s finding of actual malice
and the jury’s ultimate finding of actual malice itself.”81 As one court
of appeals opinion has put it, this means that appellate courts “must
figure out, as best we can from the cold record, which evidence the
jury accepted as credible, and which it discarded. Then we must de-
termine whether the believed evidence establishes actual malice.”82
[his mistake] and steadfastly attempted to maintain that no mistake had been made—
that the inaccurate was accurate.”
This process of clarification was led by Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, who thereby
remade constitutional fact doctrine in the image of their dissent in Bose. For a discussion of this
process, see infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
77. Note, supra note 57, at 596.
78. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc); see also Harte-Hanks, 842 F.2d at 840-41, aff’d, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (reviewing
the record and finding the jury’s determinations and inferences were not clearly erroneous).
79. See Tavoulareas, 759 F.2d at 147 (Wright, J., dissenting):
[The majority’s] approach renders the independent appellate review promised by
Bose a mirage. Independent review of the record devolves into review of the pool of
pre-selected inferences that cut against the defendant. It comes as no surprise, then,
that, at the point for the majority’s exercise of independent review, the outcome has
already been largely decided against the defendant.
80. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
81. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the “first and most significant” of the ques-
tions on which certiorari had been granted).
82. Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court pre-
scribes a similar two-step process in cases reviewing probable cause. The reviewing court is to
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Harte-Hanks therefore makes clear that the dilemma of recon-
ciling review of the whole record and deference for credibility deter-
minations cannot be side-stepped by assuming that “the jury made all
the supportive findings it reasonably could have made.”83 It did not,
however, solve this dilemma. In Harte-Hanks itself the jury’s decision
was based on three special interrogatories,84 but it is not yet clear
what courts should do when faced with a general verdict in which
credibility determinations are truly indeterminable.85
Some courts and commentators continue to try to limit subtly the
facts to which constitutional fact review will be applied, although the
distinctions drawn are more apparent than real. In an en banc deci-
sion in 1997,86 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals returned to the
problem of reconciling Rule 52(a) and independent review, an-
nouncing that it would review findings of “critical” facts de novo and
“noncritical” facts for clear error.87 In so doing, the court was over-
turning an earlier panel decision in the case,88 which had sided with
the Ninth Circuit’s approach of “pure” de novo review.89
It is doubtful that this distinction between constitutional fact re-
view as “pure” de novo review and as review of “critical” facts is
treat deferentially the trial court’s determination of the historical facts leading up to the search,
as such findings will be tightly bound up with credibility determinations. But the reviewing court
must then weigh these findings on its own and find “whether these historical facts, viewed from
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to
probable cause.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
83. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 690.
85. See Eastwood, 123 F.3d at 1252 (“Without a transcript of the jury’s deliberations, we
can only guess which facts (aside from those essential to the verdict) it must have believed. In
another case, this task might well prove impossible, forcing us to rethink our deferential-yet-de-
novo approach.”).
86. Families Achieving Independence & Respect v. Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 111 F.3d 1408
(8th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
87. Id. at 1411. As one commentator defined them:
[C]ritical facts are those factual findings of a trial court where the finding of fact and a
conclusion of law as to a federal right are so intermingled as to make it necessary to
analyze the facts in order to decide the federal constitutional question. Examples of
critical facts in free speech cases include findings regarding whether particular re-
marks are fighting words; findings as to what is patently offensive under the commu-
nity standard obscenity test; and findings regarding the existence of actual malice.
L. Steven Grasz, Critical Facts and Free Speech: The Eighth Circuit Clarifies Its Appellate Stan-
dard of Review for First Amendment Free Speech Cases, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 387, 395 (1998).
88. Families Achieving Independence & Respect v. Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 91 F.3d 1076
(8th Cir. 1996).
89. Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 1993) (adopting de novo
review of First Amendment questions because these questions present mixed questions of law
and fact).
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more than a difference in emphasis. It is true that decisions in some
circuits have emphasized that plenary review extends only to facts
concerning the constitutional right at issue,90 while most circuits do
not make this careful distinction between critical and noncritical facts,
referring only to the need for undeferential review of the whole rec-
ord.91 Steven Grasz, a supporter of the Eighth Circuit’s distinction,
points to the Supreme Court’s definition of constitutional fact in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton92 to support the former view.93 In Hurley, Justice Souter wrote for
the majority:
The requirement of independent appellate review . . . does not limit
our deference to a trial court on questions of witness credibility,
but . . . requires us to review the finding of facts by a State court . . .
where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact
are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon
the Federal question, to analyze the facts.94
This is an unremarkable definition of constitutional fact, and it
does not indicate a narrowing of the scope of review. Within a few
lines of this passage, Souter writes both that “we are obliged to make
a fresh examination of crucial facts” and that “our obligation is to
make an independent examination of the whole record,” without
giving any indication that he believes these to be somehow different
standards.95 As the Court noted in Bose, independent review is not
the same thing as de novo review in the sense of an original appraisal
of all evidence in a case. Review is limited to facts relevant to the con-
stitutional question.96 There is no evidence that courts that refer to
“independent examination of the whole record” seek to review facts
unrelated to the constitutional question on appeal.
90. E.g., Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. v. Kaufman, 113 F.3d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1997)
(noting that independent review “extends only to the ultimate factual finding of actual malice;
we do not conduct de novo review of the jury’s determination of preliminary factual issues or
questions of credibility”); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasizing facts in the record that relate to a “mixed fact/law issue
involving a core First Amendment concern”).
91. E.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[W]e are required to
make an independent examination of the record as a whole without deference to the factual
findings of the trial court.”).
92. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
93. Grasz, supra note 87, at 395.
94. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 567 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
95. Id. at 567-68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
96. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984).
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However, the definition of the field of relevant facts is a matter
to be determined by the reviewing court. The distinction between a
“crucial fact” and a “pure de novo” standard does reflect the degree
to which a particular court desires to be deferential to the trial court,
which will partly determine the breadth of the field to which it will
apply plenary review. Moreover, Grasz’s reliance on the passage in
Hurley justifying the application of constitutional fact review by the
mixed nature of the fact to be determined foreshadows the discussion
below, in which it will become clear that those who wish to limit the
application of constitutional fact review will focus on the nature of
the question being reviewed, rather than on the nature of the right
being protected.97
B. Development of the Rationales of Constitutional Fact Doctrine
As stated in the introduction, constitutional fact review has
found justification in three rationales: 1) the nature of the constitu-
tional right at issue; 2) the mixed nature of the question of law at is-
sue; and 3) distrust of the trier of fact. Constitutional fact initially
emerged in the administrative law context at least in part out of con-
cern for procedural safeguards of both economic and individual con-
stitutional rights. As the administrative line died out, a line of cases
developed that applied independent fact review out of concern for
both individual procedural rights and the need for the appellate
courts to guide issues in which law finds meaning only through its ap-
plication to facts. Over time, the latter rationale came to dominate the
“procedural line.” However, another family of cases emerged in
which independent review was again primarily justified by potential
threats to individual liberties, this time substantive First Amendment
rights.
1. Administrative Law Line. From the mid-nineteenth century,
the rule in American law was that when an administrative tribunal
acted as a factfinder, judicial review was limited to whether the
findings were supported by substantial evidence.98 In the 1920s and
1930s, however, this rule was challenged by a new doctrine of
“constitutional fact,” under which the federal courts were to review
97. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
98. Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 953, 953 (1957) (“Judicial control of the finding of fact is limited to the inquiry whether
there is substantial evidence.”).
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de novo determinations of fact that “are fundamental or
‘jurisdictional,’ in the sense that their existence is a condition
precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme.”99
The idea that there must be judicial review of the determination
of facts that bring a matter under the regulatory authority of an ad-
ministrative body has existed in the common law from the seven-
teenth century.100 The enabling statute upon which jurisdiction is
based identifies which “jurisdictional facts” must exist for an adminis-
trative body to have regulatory jurisdiction. When the enabling law is
the Constitution itself, such facts can be called “constitutional
facts.”101 For example, the Court in Crowell v. Benson,102 a case con-
cerning a claim under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, reviewed two questions of fact: 1) whether the
injury at issue took place on the navigable waters of the United
States, as the constitutional authority for Congress to pass the act in
the first place was based on Congress’s authority to legislate regard-
ing these waters; and 2) whether the injured party was an employee of
the party against whom the claim was made, as the Court regarded it
to be a violation of due process to impose absolute liability on an em-
ployer unless a master-servant relationship in fact existed.103
This sort of inquiry might seem counterintuitive to those living in
the modern administrative state. Observers assume that the authority
granted to an administrative agency includes the authority to deter-
mine facts affecting whether the matter is within the agency’s field of
regulation, and moreover that anything more than deferential review
of the great number of such determinations made each day would be
highly inefficient. What brought the Crowell Court to reject such an
approach? There are two major explanations. The first is that the
Court was stricken by a bloody-minded “naïve realism,” under which
it believed that jurisdictional determinations were natural facts to be
found rather than judgments to be made, and that each reviewing
court must find these facts for itself.104 The second is that the Court
99. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (footnote omitted).
100. Jaffe, supra note 98, at 954-55. The first such case was Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng.
Rep. 557 (Ex. 1680), which involved a tax on “strong wines.” When the petitioner claimed that
his were actually low wines, judicial review was necessary to determine if the Commissioners of
Excise had jurisdiction to levee the tax. Id. at 559.
101. Dickenson, supra note 31, at 1063, 1067.
102. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
103. Dickenson, supra note 31, at 1057-58.
104. Id. at 1074-75.
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was responding to a perceived “legitimacy deficit” in the utilization of
administrative authority and expressing a discomfort with the expan-
sion of administrative power as an imposition on due process.105
These two rationales can be seen at work in one of the first cases
to apply constitutional fact. In Ng Fung Ho v. White,106 Justice Bran-
deis, writing for the majority, justified the mandate of a “judicial
trial” of “the claim of citizenship by a resident, so supported both be-
fore the immigration officer and upon petition for a writ of habeas
corpus”107 on both jurisdictional fact and on due process grounds. The
jurisdictional issue arose because “jurisdiction in the executive . . .
exists only if the person arrested is an alien.”108 The determination of
this fact could not be left to the administrative agency because “where
there is jurisdiction a finding of fact by the executive department is
conclusive” unless there is a due process violation such as a denial of
hearing or lack of evidence to support the agency’s finding.109 The im-
plication is that, where the right at stake is important enough, to allow
the agency to have the last word on the central factual question would
itself be a violation of due process, an implication made explicit in
Brandeis’s statement later in the decision:
To deport someone who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives
him of liberty . . . . It may result also in loss of both property and life;
or of all that makes life worth living. Against the danger of such
deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings,
the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due pro-
cess of law. The difference in security of judicial over administrative
action has been adverted to by this court.110
Constitutional fact doctrine as laid out by Brandeis in Ng Fung Ho
was a more limited principle than a doctrine based purely on jurisdic-
tional fact would have been, as the opinion implied that jurisdictional
105. Monaghan, supra note 31, at 239 (noting that the court “may be required independently
to find the relevant historical facts on the basis of its own record” because of “the ‘legitimacy
deficit’ inherent in administrative adjudication”).
106. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
107. Id. at 282.
108. Id. at 284.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 284-85. The Court had earlier held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required the independent review of rate-setting actions by administrative agencies.
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289-91 (1920) (“In all such cases [in
which the administrative agency legislatively prescribed a rate schedule] . . . the State must pro-
vide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its
own independent judgment . . . .”).
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facts required de novo review only when the threat to liberty was a
significant one.111
As mentioned above, the Court’s 1932 decision in Crowell v.
Benson also mandated the review of jurisdictional facts based in the
Constitution, citing Ng Fung Ho to the effect that due process is en-
dangered when an administrative agency makes “the final determina-
tion of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the
constitutional rights of the citizen depend.”112 Brandeis, however, dis-
sented in Crowell. He rejected the entire concept of jurisdictional
fact, as “[t]he power of Congress to provide by legislation for liability
under certain circumstances subsumes the power to provide for the
determination of the existence of those circumstances.”113 Under the
majority’s approach, Brandeis argued, the commissioner would not
have final say over any fact to be determined before the question of
liability itself.114
In a highly influential article, John Dickenson joined Brandeis’s
critique of jurisdictional fact, on the grounds that the doctrine of con-
stitutional fact as articulated in Crowell had the potential to draw re-
viewing courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, into the full-time
business of factfinding.115 The resulting decisions would undermine
administrative efficiency without serving any useful appellate end, as
“being only decisions on facts, [these decisions] have small value or
no value as guides in future cases.”116 Dickenson further complained
that there was no way to determine the facts to which de novo review
applied, since under the Crowell Court’s definition of due process,
“there is practically no issue going to the substantial merits of a con-
111. Jaffe, supra note 98, at 969 (arguing that not every jurisdictional fact must be deter-
mined judicially, but only those of greatest import).
112. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932). Crowell also dealt with other jurisdictional
issues: whether the granting of such judicial power to an executive commissioner violated Arti-
cle III or the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 37. While Crowell’s holding on jurisdictional fact long
ago lost relevance, these other issues remain active areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence. For a
discussion of Crowell and its progeny in this regard, see Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Arti-
cle III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037 (1999) (analyzing the Court’s deci-
sions regarding the constitutionality of jury-less adjudications in legislative courts).
113. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 73-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115. Dickenson, supra note 31, at 1077 (“It would be . . . disruptive of administrative proc-
esses, to hold that every fact-issue on which a claim of constitutional right can be made to de-
pend becomes thereby entitled to a retrial on new evidence in a review proceeding at law.”).
116. Id. at 1074-75.
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troversy which if ‘unreasonably’ decided by an administrative tribunal
cannot be made the basis of a . . . constitutional right.”117
The potential in Crowell for the general de novo review of ad-
ministrative findings was limited in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States,118 in which the Court recognized the need to give defer-
ence to the findings of administrative agencies where these findings
were based on the superior expertise of those agencies.119 Justice
Brandeis concurred with the decision, reconciling his seemingly con-
tradictory arguments in Ng Fung Ho and Crowell. While still rejecting
jurisdictional fact, Justice Brandeis called for de novo review where
“the right to liberty of person” was threatened.120 As St. Joseph was a
takings case, Justice Brandeis concurred in the application of deferen-
tial review.121
After St. Joseph, jurisdictional fact review disappeared from
American administrative law. Although the Supreme Court never ex-
plicitly overruled Crowell, deference to administrative decisions now
extends beyond their findings of jurisdictional fact to their interpreta-
tions of their own enabling statutes.122 The de novo review of adminis-
trative findings of fact where fundamental rights are at issue is still
occasionally applied, however.123 For example, Brandeis’s standard
was borne for a time by Justice Marshall, who invoked Ng Fung Ho in
finding that the Immigration and Nationalization Act requires de
117. Id. at 1077. Louis Jaffe contends that Dickenson was mistaken in his contention that
there was no limiting principle to the Crowell decision’s application of constitutional fact. Jaffe,
supra note 98, at 972-73. Professor Jaffe argues that the decision makes it clear that constitu-
tional facts are only those facts which are of particular constitutional significance, and that the
court assumes that these would be few in number. Id. at 972. Professor Jaffe assumes that the
majority implicitly adopts the limiting principle of Brandeis in Ng Fung Ho. Id. at 972 n.66.
Even if this is true, it is far from evident that a clear limiting principle can be constructed from a
focus on the importance of the right at issue, as it is difficult to prioritize rights. This is the cen-
tral point of the critiques of constitutional fact doctrine discussed infra notes 210-15 and accom-
panying text.
118. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
119. Id. at 54.
120. Id. at 77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 77-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
122. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding the Environmental
Protection Agency’s interpretation of a portion of its enabling statute, the Clean Air Act).
123. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 872 (1994) (explaining
that some lower federal courts and state courts still apply the Ben Avon doctrine, which requires
full review where a constitutional issue is raised).
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novo review when a resident who claims to be a citizen can supply
some quantum of proof.124
2. “Procedural Liberty” Line. The same year that constitutional
fact review in administrative law was largely quashed in St. Joseph, a
new line of constitutional fact cases centering on Fourth and Fifth
Amendment claims was initiated in Norris v. Alabama.125 In Norris,
the Court reviewed an equal protection claim where blacks were
excluded from a grand jury when a black person was on trial.126
Conceding that the inquiry into the cause of this exclusion was an
issue of fact, the Court held:
That the question is one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to de-
termine whether in truth a federal right has been denied. When a
federal right has been specially set up and claimed in a state court, it
is our province to inquire not merely whether it was denied in ex-
press terms but also whether it was denied in substance and effect. If
this requires an examination of evidence, that examination must be
made. Otherwise, review by this Court would fail of its purpose in
safeguarding constitutional rights. Thus, whenever a conclusion of
law of a state court as to a federal right and findings of fact are so in-
termingled that the latter control the former, it is incumbent upon us
to analyze the facts in order that the appropriate enforcement of the
federal right may be assured.127
Commentators have argued that Norris picked up and carried
forth the concern for procedural liberty expressed in Ng Fung Ho and
Crowell.128 However, the Norris Court also relied on an older princi-
ple to justify de novo fact review. The passage quoted above cited a
1912 case, Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias of Georgia,129
and a 1927 case, Fiske v. Kansas,130 for the proposition that
124. Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978). Justice Marshall also argued that constitutional
fact doctrine should be applied to a magistrate’s findings in a suppression hearing. United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 712 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
126. Id. at 596.
127. Id. at 589-90.
128. E.g., Monaghan, supra note 31, at 260-62 (“While commentators focused on Crowell’s
decline in the field of administrative law, they began to notice that constitutional fact review had
become the operative measure of the Supreme Court’s general appellate jurisdiction.”); Strong,
supra note 25, at 245 (“Neither Ben Avon, Crowell nor Fung Ho is anywhere cited in the opin-
ion, but there is no mistaking that the degree of independent judicial review surviving from
them constitutes the decision’s inarticulated major premise.”).
129. 225 U.S. 246 (1912).
130. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
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this Court will review the finding of facts by a State court where a
federal right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the
record to be without evidence to support it; or where a conclusion of
law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as
to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to
analyze the facts.131
Both Creswill and Fiske were decided on substantial-evidence
grounds, but the latter principle, that de novo fact review is appropri-
ate where the issue is a mixed question of fact and law concerning a
constitutional right, remained dormant and available for the Norris
Court to pick up in 1935.
The Norris Court did not make a new inquiry into historical
events or a new judgment about the credibility of the witnesses. It did,
however, independently determine what weight to give to the facts in
the record. The Court weighed the uncontroverted fact that there
were no blacks on the jury rolls, and the fact that no black person had
served on a jury in the county in question in living memory, against
the claims of county officials that no racial motivation lay behind
these omissions, and concluded that the evidence supported the fac-
tual conclusion that blacks had been excluded from juries because of
their race.132
In later cases in the Norris line, the Court would continue to
utilize this approach of accepting the trial court’s findings on the un-
derlying facts while making its own determination of the significance
of those facts.133 In Watts v. Indiana,134 for example, Justice Frank-
furter wrote that “‘issue of fact’ is a coat of many colors. It does not
cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that
conclusion incorporates standards of conduct or criteria for judgment
which in themselves are decisive of constitutional rights.”135
The Supreme Court justified plenary review of such mixed ques-
tions of fact on the principle that the appellate courts should control
the development of the law. Where the rule of law and the facts of the
131. Id. at 385-86. In Creswill, the Court made the same point: “[W]here a Federal right has
been denied as the result of a finding of fact which it is contended there was no evidence what-
ever to support and the evidence is in the record the resulting question of law is open for deci-
sion.” 225 U.S. at 261.
132. Norris, 294 U.S. at 590-93.
133. The line includes Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (reviewing a collateral estop-
pel/double jeopardy determination), Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (reviewing the vol-
untariness of a confession), and Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (same).
134. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
135. Id. at 51.
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case are intermingled, the rule of law is developed through its applica-
tion. On this basis, plenary review is inappropriate where, as Dicken-
son argued in his critique of administrative constitutional fact, deci-
sions “have small value or no value as guides to future cases.”136 The
Court therefore refused to apply independent review to issues, such
as a unitary business question in a tax case, where the “legal princi-
ples defining the constitutional limits . . . are now well established”
and the record is too complex to be fully reconstructed by an appel-
late court.137
This is not to say that the Court was merely concerned with law
declaration in these cases, or that effective declaration was always
possible. For example, in the field of review Watts initiated, the volun-
tariness of confessions, the Court was drawn into a series of highly
fact-specific inquiries that did not result in clear rules such that the
Court could ever leave the field. The Court finally escaped this bur-
den of review only by vastly simplifying voluntariness down to the
technicalities of Escobedo and Miranda.138
It can be argued that because the application of plenary review in
the procedural line of cases is primarily justified by the mixed nature
of the questions addressed, these cases are not about constitutional
facts at all, but are rather examples of a traditional doctrine under
which all mixed questions of fact and law are subject to independent
review. Steven Childress, for example, has argued that there has been
a general “over-labeling” of such cases as constitutional fact cases.139
All mixed questions of fact and law are in theory subject to plenary
review,140 but the Supreme Court in practice applies deferential re-
136. Dickenson, supra note 31, at 1075.
137. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983). The Court may
have also been unsympathetic to applying constitutional fact review to this case because indi-
vidual liberty was not at issue.
138.  Frank R. Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 47 N.C. L.
REV. 311, 327 (1969); Strong, supra note 25, at 281-82; see also Keith R. Dolliver, Comment,
Voluntariness of Confessions in Habeas Corpus Proceedings: The Proper Standard for Appellate
Review, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 141, 145 (1990) (“Miranda itself can be understood as an effort by
the Court to develop a clear rule that would free it from case-by-case determinations of volun-
tariness.”). The Court’s recent decision to uphold Miranda in Dickenson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000), indicates that the Court continues in its desire to avoid the issue as much as
possible.
139. Childress, supra note 26, at 1240 (“To the extent that these cases merely restate the oft-
cited rule that legal conclusions or mixed law-fact questions fall outside complete fact-finding
protections, such as the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule 52(a), they are not revolu-
tionary or particularly necessary as a separate exception.”).
140. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982) (noting that mixed questions of
fact and law are subject to appellate review).
HOFFMAN 04/30/01  4:05 PM
2001] CORRALLING CONSTITUTIONAL FACT 1453
view where constitutional rights are not implicated.141 This indicates
that even though the mixed nature of the questions involved is the
explicit and primary reason the Court has applied plenary review in
these cases, the constitutional implications of the facts involved are an
important, if sometimes unstated, motivation for the application of
this standard of review.
3. “Substantive Liberty” Line. The area of the law to which the
doctrine of constitutional fact has been most consistently applied is
the First Amendment. Beginning with Pennekamp v. Florida,142 the
Supreme Court has consistently held that reviewing courts must
“examine for [them]selves the statements in issue and the
circumstances under which they were made” to see whether the
statements represent protected speech.143 As with the procedural-
liberty line of cases, in the substantive liberty cases “it is the findings
of the state courts on undisputed facts or the undisputed facts
themselves which ordinarily furnish the basis for [the Court’s]
appraisal of claimed violations of constitutional rights.”144 The Court
does not conduct a new trial of the underlying facts, but it will weigh
these facts independently.
Unlike review in the procedural-liberty line, however, the un-
derlying motive for review in First Amendment cases has often been
more about the protection of rights in individual cases than about
guiding the development of the rule through controlling its applica-
tion in a mixed question of fact and law.145 Nowhere has this been
clearer than in the area of obscenity review. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,146
the Court, citing Watts, Norris, Pennekamp, Ng Fung Ho, and Crow-
ell, held that reviewing courts must make an independent review of
141. Jeffrey Grybowski, Note, The Appellate Role in Ensuring Justice in Fourth Amendment
Controversies: Ornelas v. United States, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1819, 1843-44 (1997) (citing, among
other cases, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (applying deferential review
to a lower court’s determination that an attorney held a “reasonable belief” that the suit he
brought was not frivolous under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); and Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1960) (reviewing with deference the holding of a
lower court that a transaction constituted a “gift” for tax purposes)).
142. 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (concerning whether a newspaper’s criticism of a court constituted
a “clear and present danger” such that the criticism could be punished as contempt of court).
143. Id. at 335.
144. Id. at 345.
145. Childress, supra note 26, at 1235 (arguing that constitutional fact doctrine in First
Amendment cases “finds its source not in law-declaration but rather in a separate protectionist
role placed on the courts under a heightened due process standard”).
146. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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allegedly obscene material.147 The Court admitted that it could have
applied a sufficient-evidence standard, but held that its duty to up-
hold due process forced it to shoulder “a difficult, unpleasant, and re-
curring task.”148 Chief Justice Warren dissented, calling for a rule of
reason that would free the Supreme Court from “sitting as the Super
Censor of all the obscenity purveyed throughout the nation.”149
The Court was not oblivious of the need to draw lines by which
to guide lower courts trying and reviewing obscenity cases. But the
standard for finding obscenity—whether “to the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest”150— inher-
ently resisted clarification by a national court. Moreover, any defini-
tions that were established could find support from no more than a
plurality on the Court, keeping the field open for a changing array of
coalitions and approaches. Finally, in Miller v. California,151 Chief Jus-
tice Burger wrote for a clearly frustrated majority of six in trying to
put an end to “the ‘intractable obscenity problem’” by drawing a
bright line limiting obscenity to hard-core pornography that contains
the depiction or description of sexual conduct or genitalia.152 It cannot
be said that this rule emerged from the process of applying the previ-
ous obscenity standard; it was more an attempt to limit the Court’s
involvement in an arena in which application had utterly failed to
produce a clearer rule.153
147. Id. at 187-88.
148. Id. at 187.
149. Id. at 203 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
150. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
151. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
152. Id. at 16, 24 (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring and dissenting)).
153. Even then, Justice Douglas was unimpressed by the majority’s effort at law declaration,
arguing that the only relief from the “I know it when I see it” model of review was for the courts
to refrain from regulating obscenity at all. Id. at 41 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Miller decision
largely enabled the Court to declare victory and leave the field, but obscenity cases still occa-
sionally would be granted certiorari. In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), for example, the
Court held that the film Carnal Knowledge (Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer 1971) was clearly not the
sort of “hard core” material the Miller rule described. Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist granted that the Court would protect First Amendment rights through independent
review, but expressed frustration that it should have to in cases such as this. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at
160-61. For a recent case attempting to clarify further which aspects of the Miller test are subject
to independent review, see United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise, 230 F.3d 649, 653
(3d Cir. 2000), which held that the determination of whether the work “appeals to the prurient
interest” under “contemporary community standards” is to be reviewed for clear error, while
the determination of whether the work depicts sexual conduct “in a patently offensive way” and
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The substantive line of constitutional fact review took on new
strength with Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,154
which has been interpreted by lower courts to require plenary review
in all cases involving First Amendment issues, even where the issue is
freedom of religion rather than freedom of speech.155 As mentioned
above,156 the Bose Court ruled that despite Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 52(a), which requires that findings of facts be reviewed on a
clear-error standard, reviewing courts must independently review
findings of actual malice in defamation suits. The principle of inde-
pendent review in defamation suits comes from New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,157 in which the Court held that “[w]e must ‘make an inde-
pendent examination of the whole record,’ so as to assure ourselves
that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the
field of free expression.”158
The Sullivan Court does not express much concern about law
declaration in this passage. The Bose Court, however, justified ple-
nary review of actual-malice determinations on both the nature of the
question and the nature of the right, asserting that “the content of the
rule is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given
meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudica-
tion . . . [and] the constitutional values protected by the rule make it
imperative that judges . . . make sure that it is correctly applied.”159
whether the work has serious “literary, artistic, political or scientific value” is to be made de
novo.
154. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
155. E.g., Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 752 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the question of
whether the average person would regard a state action as endorsing a particular religion is a
constitutional fact); New Life Baptist Church Acad. v. Town of East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d
940, 941-42 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the Bose standard applies in a freedom of religion case);
Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 255, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting, in a case reviewing whether
statements made by a dismissed employee were protected speech or “rumor-mongering,” that
where the issue is the First Amendment, the court must make an independent review of the rec-
ord).
156. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
157. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
158. Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
159. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501-02 (1984). For examples of the evolutionary process of the com-
mon law, the Bose Court looked to the jurisprudence of fighting words and obscenity, where the
“Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the record both to be sure that the
speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters
of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that pro-
tected expression will not be inhibited.” Id. at 505. The Court quoted Justice Harlan in Roth v.
United States to support this proposition: “Since [the standards of obscenity] do not readily lend
themselves to generalized definitions, the constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes
one of particularized judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves.” Id. at 506
n.25 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dis-
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Despite the Court’s appeal to its roles both as a protector against spe-
cific threats to the individual liberty at issue in the case and as the
shepherd of the law through its application, commentators on the
case have argued that the Bose Court was truly concerned with only
the immediate issue of rights protection.160 This argument is supported
by the fact that once the Bose Court justified applying plenary review
to the question of actual malice, it determined the factual question
with little or no attempt to extract rules or principles of application
from its efforts.
4. Distrust of the Finder of Fact. Before moving on to the post-
Bose development of constitutional fact, it is useful to reflect on the
third justification for applying plenary review to issues of
constitutional fact. The first two, the need to protect an individual
right through appellate review and the need for the appellate courts
to supervise the development of rules where those rules emerge only
through the process of determining mixed questions of fact and law,
are clear enough in the case law and have been discussed above.
Distrust of the factfinder is often also a reason, if unstated, to conduct
plenary review. Such distrust logically must exist where the primary
justification for nondeferential review is the protection of a right, for
there would be no need for such a standard if the trial court were
trusted to protect the right itself. There is no corresponding logical
necessity that such distrust exist where plenary review is justified by
the nature of the question, because such review can be premised on
the need for consistency in the interpretation and declaration of the
law rather than on any imputation of incompetence or bias on the
part of the trial court.161
There is often just such an imputation, however, even in the
cases that justify review primarily on the nature of the question. It is
senting)). Interestingly, this passage seems to support the idea that independent review is neces-
sary despite the impossibility of law declaration in the obscenity field, rather than because of the
need to declare law.
160. E.g., Childress, supra note 26, at 1256-62 (analyzing the impact of the Bose decision);
Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35
AM. U. L. REV. 3, 35 (1985) (“[T]he constitutional values protected by the rule [r]eceived the
court’s most extensive attention and ultimately constituted the ratio decidendi for the Bose deci-
sion.”).
161. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (applying independent review
because deference to trial courts’ determinations of probable cause would allow for different
results in similar cases, and “[s]uch varied results would be inconsistent with the idea of a uni-
tary system of law”); Alexander, supra note 22, at 185 (describing the desire for uniformity of
the law as a motivating factor in judicial review).
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argued that the trial court’s findings should be treated deferentially
unless the appellate court has some special competence, or the trial
court some special bias, in making the sort of finding at issue. For ex-
ample, in his dissent to Bose, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
O’Connor, argued strongly that the finding of actual malice is the de-
termination of the actual state of mind of the alleged defamer, and
therefore involves historical and credibility determinations that are in
the special competence of the jury.162 Justice Rehnquist contended
that constitutional fact doctrine should be limited to determinations
such as those in obscenity or fighting-words cases, where the issue is
not historical fact but what the reaction of a “reasonable person” to
speech would be.163 Justice Rehnquist suggested that an appellate
court is at least as competent as any other judicial actor to make this
determination.164
With regard to this last point, it is equally plausible to say that
the trier of fact is in a better position to know the full circumstances
of the case and therefore to be able to put itself in the shoes of the
“reasonable person” in that situation. Moreover, many reasonable-
ness standards are supposed to reflect the reason of a particular
community, making it likely that a local judge or especially a jury is
more competent than the Supreme Court to make such findings.
However, Justice Rehnquist’s point may be less that Supreme
Court Justices are better able to channel the spirit of the reasonable
person than that the reasonable person standard is a standard of law,
even when left with the jury, and so it is ultimately within the purview
of the appellate courts. This point recapitulates an argument made at
the turn of the century in the debate over whether negligence is a
question of law or fact. The major protagonists in this debate were
James Thayer, who argued that a finding of negligence was a finding
of fact because it was not a choice between precedentially established
rules,165 and Oliver Wendell Holmes, who argued that a finding of
negligence was one of law because it established a standard of con-
duct, even if that standard was good for one case only.166 This dispute
between Thayer and Holmes can be seen as being about whether the
determination of negligence is a question of is or a question of ought.
162. Bose, 466 U.S. at 515-17 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
163. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165. James B. Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 154 (1890).
166. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 122-24 (1881); Holmes, supra note 5,
at 458-59 (1899).
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Thayer argued that it is a question of is, an appeal to general experi-
ence on how the prudent man would act in a given set of circum-
stances.167
In the 1920’s, Francis Bohlen countered:
Were the “reasonable man” identical with the average man and
were the question what the average conduct of mankind under
similar circumstances is, the question would be purely one of fact—
of what is or exists . . . . But the “reasonable man” is not the average
man. He is an ideal creature, expressing public opinion declared by
its accredited spokesman, whether court or jury, as to what ought to
be due under the circumstances . . . . The factor controlling the
judgment of the defendant’s conduct is not what is, but what ought
to be.168
Like Holmes, Bohlen believed that such a standard, which determines
rights and responsibilities, even if only in one case at a time, was
closer to law than to fact.169 However, just because to rule on what the
reasonable man would find is to declare the law, it does not mean that
this project has to be undertaken by a judge, as the allocation of the
negligence determination to the jury shows. Justice Rehnquist’s Bose
dissent tells us when we should leave decisions in the hands of the
jury—when credibility is at issue—but identifying a question as one of
law does not in itself say why we should take the final judgment of
that question away from the trier of fact.
Interestingly, James Thayer also had much to say about the pro-
cess by which judges take questions of fact away from juries. Profes-
sor Thayer described several strategies by which judges have usurped
the role of jury as factfinder.170 One such strategy is to fix the defini-
tions of legal terms. Once a term like “malice,” “false pretenses,”
“fraud,” or “insanity” is attached to a question of fact, judges may
take over the factfinding process in the name of giving definition to
167. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
227-28 (1898).
168. BOHLEN, supra note 5, at 603-04.
169. Morris, supra note 5, at 1315-16 (recognizing that Bohlen thought that a verdict deter-
mining whether defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man was a decision relating more close
to law than fact); see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 n.13 (1995) (arguing that what
jurors do in negligence cases is much like what judges do, except that it cannot be reduced to a
definite rule).
170. Thayer, supra note 165, at 162, 166 (discussing judges’ use of demurrers upon evidence
and rules of presumption).
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the term.171 Martin Louis has noted that through their classifying
power, courts can classify as mixed or legal issues questions that are
otherwise indistinguishable from fact.172 But whereas once courts re-
classified because they did not trust juries to decide certain questions
rationally, in recent decades courts have done so more out of a wish
to have the final say on “questions of law.”173 One could say that the
Supreme Court has used its power to reclassify questions of fact as
questions of constitutional fact to ensure that it has the final word.
The Court has taken what might otherwise be seen as descriptions of
historical fact, like “reasonable suspicion” or “actual malice,” and by
calling them legal standards has made it necessary for appellate courts
to conduct plenary review over their application.
C. Post-Bose Developments: The Fusing of Procedural and
Substantive Lines
The Bose decision evoked considerable criticism, much of it con-
cerned with the prospect that the Court was establishing a doctrine of
independent review that could not be limited to defamation suits.174
Like Professor Dickenson before them, critics like Professor Mona-
ghan worried that an overly expansive constitutional fact doctrine
would either overwhelm the federal docket or force appellate courts
to withdraw from independent review of facts altogether. As one
commentator sympathetic to the need for independent judgment “on
facts that are controlling of constitutionality” pointed out, constitu-
tional fact review can lead to a quagmire of case-by-case determina-
tions when combined with the sort of constitutional standards “that
are the product of judicial balancing of individual right and public in-
terest” appearing in “lines especially demanding of factual judgment
for their effective enforcement.”175 As we have seen, such quagmires
171. Id. at 161-62. Of course, many questions of ultimate fact have such terms attached to
them, including negligence. Again, it would seem that the existence of such a term does not in
itself necessitate the reallocation of a question from jury to judge, absent a policy motivation to
do so.
172. Louis, supra note 24, at 1027-28. Louis suggests that the construction of writings is such
an instance.
173. Id. at 1028 n.260.
174. E.g., George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 39
(1992) (focusing on the determination of how the judicial question should be addressed to iden-
tify which decision-maker should decide the question); Monaghan, supra note 31, at 264, 269-70
(noting that it is difficult to believe that all First Amendment rules suffer from the defects of
rules in defamation cases).
175. Strong, supra note 25, at 279, 281.
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developed from the Court’s involvement in determinations of the
voluntariness of confessions, from which it extricated itself only
through the somewhat mechanical rules of Escobedo and Miranda,176
and in the Court’s review of obscenity findings, which required the
Justices personally to pass on the speech value of the material at issue
in a “constitutional disaster area”177 that the Court could only escape
by drawing a (somewhat) bright line in Miller v. California.178
To guard against such difficulties, Henry Monaghan suggested
that constitutional fact review should be limited to cases in which
there was either the need and the possibility for a case-by-case devel-
opment of the law, or a danger of a systematic bias on the part of the
trier of fact.179 He specifically rejected any reliance on the nature of
the right as a guide to application, arguing that the source and limits
of distinctions such as Brandeis’s prioritization of personal rights
were too unclear.180 Citing Monaghan,181 the Court soon moved to re-
define constitutional fact doctrine so that both the substantive and
procedural lines were justified primarily on the nature of the question
at issue rather than the nature of the right under threat.182
The central case in this redefinition was Miller v. Fenton,183 in
which the Court reaffirmed that state findings on the voluntariness of
confessions were subject to plenary federal review, despite 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)’s requirement that findings of fact be reviewed for sufficient
evidence.184 Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor held that non-
deferential review should be applied where 1) as with First Amend-
ment cases, the law is given meaning through its application to par-
176. Id. at 281-82.
177. Id. at 281.
178. Such concerns were bound to find resonance with a Court so concerned about docket
pressure and judicial efficiency that Justice Rehnquist at one time argued that we have “a
seeming compulsion to make sure that the result reached in any case is the correct one,” and
that given the cost to lawyers’ time, finality, and the speed of disposition, “perhaps, speaking of
the federal system, the time has come to abolish appeal as a matter of right from the district
courts to the courts of appeals.” William H. Rehnquist, Address Before the 75th Anniversary of
the University of Florida College of Law and the Dedication of Bruton-Geer Hall (Sept. 15,
1984), in L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 21, 1984, at 4 (excerpting speech in which Rehnquist expresses
concerns about the balance between efficiency and accuracy).
179. Monaghan, supra note 31, at 271.
180. Id. at 265-66.
181. Monaghan, supra note 31, at 237 (cited in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
182. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 17, § 2.19 (arguing that in recent years the Court has
interpreted Bose in such a way as to align it with traditional mixed-question doctrine, focusing
on legal reasoning rather than constitutional ramifications).
183. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
184. Id. at 118.
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ticular circumstances; or 2) review compensates for perceived bias by
the trier of fact.185 Plenary review is contraindicated where the finding
is primarily based on the determination of the credibility of wit-
nesses.186 This test was framed as an issue of judicial competence, for
“the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination
that . . . one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide
the issue in question.”187
In the course of this discussion, Justice O’Connor primarily cited
Monaghan, Bose, and Justice Rehnquist’s dissent to Bose, implying
that the test in Miller was equally applicable to the substantive and
procedural lines. In subsequent cases considering whether to apply
plenary review to questions of fact, the Court has followed Miller in
its analysis, focusing on the nature of the question rather than the na-
ture of the right, whether the case has involved a procedural claim188
or a speech issue.189 The Miller approach has found unanimous accep-
tance on the Court. In Ornelas v. United States,190 for example, all nine
of the Justices agreed that the test for whether to apply plenary re-
view hinged on whether the rule at issue developed through applica-
tion and on the respective competence of the trial and reviewing
court.191
The Court also has interpreted its decision in Bose to be fully
compatible with deference to the trier of fact’s credibility determina-
tions. In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,192 the
Court held that its rejection in Bose of the jury’s determination that
the writer of the article in question, who unconvincingly denied that
he had made any mistakes in his article, acted with actual malice did
not entail a rejection of the jury’s finding that the writer was not a
185. Id. at 116-17.
186. Id. at 114.
187. Id.
188. E.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 367-69 (1991) (rejecting the application of
plenary review to a Batson claim where the issue is distinguishable from Bose, Miller, and Nor-
ris).
189. E.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 567
(1995) (applying plenary review to a question of whether the application of a state law in which
parade sponsors were required to include the group in its parade was a violation of the sponsors’
speech rights).
190. 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
191. Id. at 699. The case was an 8-to-1 decision. Justice Scalia agreed on the “essentially
practical” considerations in the majority’s approach, but disagreed on their application of these
considerations. Id. at 700-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
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credible witness.193 The Court accepted that he was not credible, but
drew a different inference from this determination: that the writer
gave self-serving testimony on the stand, not that he acted with malice
when writing the article.194
With credibility thus defined in a binary matter—the Court must
accept the jury’s determination that a witness is a liar, but it need not
necessarily accept the jury’s determination of about what the witness
is a liar—the decision in Bose is fully compatible with the “two-
tiered” approach taken in recent procedural-liberty cases, in which
the Court accepts the state court’s determination of the underlying
historical facts, but makes its own findings on what import to grant
these facts.195
II.  CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT
A. Effectiveness in Practice
As has been described above, the major concern with constitu-
tional fact doctrine is that if it is defined too expansively, it will over-
whelm the docket of the federal appellate courts. One possible solu-
tion to this problem, available at least to the Supreme Court, is to use
the discretion of certiorari to refuse to engage in plenary review. But
this puts the Court in the position of ignoring “constitutionally offen-
sive results”196 and does nothing to lessen the docket pressures on the
courts of appeals. Another solution is to “fashion new, more detailed
rules of substantive law, narrowing the discretionary scope of the
trial-level determination and helping to characterize the particular re-
sults as clearly right or wrong.”197 This was the path chosen by the
Court in its efforts to pull itself out of the morass of plenary fact re-
view of obscenity and the voluntariness of confessions. The problem
with this approach is that the rules created thereby can be formalistic
and rigid.198
193. Id. at 689 n.35.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
196. Louis, supra note 24, at 1038.
197. Id. at 1037.
198. Id. at 1038.
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The Court’s current doctrine for applying constitutional fact re-
view, as laid out in Miller v. Fenton,199 is an attempt to allow for ple-
nary review while limiting its application to situations where law dec-
laration is actually possible. If one were to judge the success of this
solution from the Court’s own sense of comfort in expanding the ap-
plication of constitutional fact, one would have to say that it has been
largely successful. In the 1990s, the Court has been willing in Thomp-
son v. Keohane200 to hold that the determination of whether a suspect
is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is a mixed question subject
to independent federal review, and in Ornelas v. United States201 to
hold that determinations of “reasonable suspicion” and “probable
cause” were subject to independent review. And the Court has not
felt it necessary to correct the impression on the part of several courts
of appeals that all First Amendment questions are subject to plenary
review.202
Whether the focus on the mixed nature of the question an-
nounced by Miller is an effective guide to lower courts is less certain,
in part because there are relatively few cases that consider whether to
apply plenary review as a matter of first impression. Tolbert v. Page203
and Mahaffey v. Page,204 described at the beginning of this Note,205 are
somewhat unusual in that these decisions include extensive discus-
sions of the proper standard of review. Other cases do little more
than declare that the matter at hand is206 or is not207 a constitutional
fact. It is interesting to note that Tolbert, in rejecting plenary review
of the first stage of the Batson test, follows Miller closely, indicating
that Miller is a useful tool for those who would restrict the application
of plenary review. The Tolbert court found that the determination of
whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination in the use of a
199. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
200. 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
201. 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996).
202. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
203. 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
204. 162 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1998).
205. See supra notes 3-16 and accompanying text.
206. E.g., Continental Trend Res., Inc. v. Oxy U.S.A. Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 642-43 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that whether a punitive-damage award is unconstitutionally excessive under
BMW v. Gore is a question of constitutional fact); Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d
261, 265 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that whether homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class is a consti-
tutional fact).
207. E.g., Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 715-16 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the question of whether a police officer has used excessive force in violation of § 1983 is not
a constitutional fact).
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peremptory challenge is too tied to case-specific determinations of
credibility to lend itself to the development of a rule through applica-
tion, and that the trial court is in the best position to make such de-
terminations.208 The Mahaffey court, on the other hand, in holding
that plenary review does apply to the same question, had to veer from
the Miller approach. The court did find that fact patterns in Batson
claims will reoccur, so that independent review can provide guidance
in future cases, but based its decision primarily on the heightened
threat to the individual rights of the defendant in the case.209
B. The Nature of the Question as an Incomplete Limit
The limiting factor of the Miller approach to the scope of appli-
cation of constitutional fact review is based on the assumption that in-
stances where rules governing constitutional rights are developed
through application are identifiable and limited in number. However,
this view assumes that questions are by nature mixed or unmixed and
ignores that courts themselves play a large role in how a question is
categorized and whether a rule can be said to be determined through
pure law declaration or through application.
What are mixed questions of law and fact anyway? Walter Cook,
writing in 1936 when the distinction between statements of fact and
conclusions of law was still central to pleading procedures, noted that
pleadings were full of terms that were both statements of fact and
conclusions of law.210 Cook gives the example of a statement that a
plaintiff is “lawfully possessed” of something as a statement about
both factual events and legal consequence.211 Clarence Morris pro-
vided an even clearer example by posing the question, “Are they
married?” Morris had a clear definition of law and of fact—
“[p]ropositions of fact are descriptive, conclusions of law are
dispositive”212—but noted that the question above is both a question
of fact and of law. To answer it, one may require either the probative
fact that X saw the ceremony with his own eyes, or the application of
the legal definition of marriage to the circumstances of the cere-
mony.213
208. 182 F.3d at 684.
209. 162 F.3d at 484.
210. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Facts” and “Statements of Fact,” 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 243
(1936).
211. Id.
212. Morris, supra note 5, at 1329.
213. Id. at 1328-29.
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A very wide range of questions could similarly have both factual
and legal elements, but Morris further recognized that the sort of an-
swer required in any one case depends on the function the question
plays in that case, not on the nature of the question itself. Morris
noted that when parties dispute only facts, it is because they have
agreed, tacitly, on the acceptability of certain rules of law. When they
dispute only questions of law, it is because they have agreed, tacitly,
on the facts.214 For example, if the question at issue is whether D con-
ducted an illegal lottery, it is a question both of fact and law. But if
the legal definition of lottery and the scope of the law is clear, it is
primarily a question of fact. The dispositive element may not even be
noticed.215
This raises this possibility that many issues were at one time
mixed questions of fact or law but as one element or another became
settled, they became more purely either issues of fact or of law. As we
have seen,216 the process can work in both directions, and issues of fact
or law can be recategorized as mixed. Questions that have become
settled instances of fact determination, such as obscenity or probable
cause, can be recategorized as being more about determining rules of
law. Although under the test of Miller v. Fenton it may take more
logical gymnastics to make a question of fact into a question of consti-
tutional fact, especially in comparison to Brandeis’s call in Ng Fung
Ho for plenary review whenever a threat to individual liberty exists,
the extra effort is required because several steps are necessary to
reframe the question, not because the inherent nature of questions
themselves resists reframing.217
Take the review of the first step of a Batson claim, for example.218
By calling the question a “prima facie” determination, and by naming
the claim as a whole after a Supreme Court case, the Court makes it
clear to the legal reader that the issue is at least partly one of law.
Moreover, the constitutional import of the question is clear, as it in-
214. Id. at 1305 n.4.
215. Id. at 1330.
216. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
217. On the other hand, the focus on the nature of the question may be inherently more
conservative than a focus on the nature of the right, because when it is determined that a right is
in need of special appellate protection, it is very hard to explain why similar rights do not de-
serve the same protections, creating the risk that the application of constitutional fact review, if
applied consistently, will spread metonymically to all rights. A focus on the question, on the
other hand, even if it involves the recategorization of that question, looks at the structure of
each question in turn, and so is at least a more evolutionary process.
218. See supra note 4.
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volves both the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments.219 But even
here, a court following the Miller test must find that the appellate
courts are in as good or better a position as the trial court to weigh
the legal effect of the facts in the case, and that the issue is one that
lends itself to the generalization of a rule from application, before
constitutional fact review can be appropriately applied.220 Whether
any particular issue satisfies this test, the fact that finding that it does
must be so justified at least imposes an additional burden on a court
seeking to expand constitutional fact review. This is one explanation
for why the Tolbert court, applying the Miller test strictly, did not rule
that constitutional fact review applied to the first step of the Batson
test,221 while the Mahaffey court, which did not follow Miller strictly,
did expand the scope of application of constitutional fact review.222
Another explanation is, of course, that courts must be motivated
to expand the scope of application of constitutional fact review. If, as
has been postulated in this part, there is some doubt as to whether
questions are ever inherently ones of fact, law, or mixed questions of
fact and law, the determination of which questions receive such
treatment would seem to continue to greatly depend on the other two
rationales behind constitutional review—distrust for the finder of fact
and a perceived need to protect a right. The current approach to con-
stitutional fact gives these factors a less formal place in the federal
appellate court’s analysis, but they must always be present as moti-
vating forces.
219. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
